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SIXTY YEARS AFTER THE UN
PARTITION RESOLUTION: WHAT
FUTURE FOR THE ARAB ECONOMY
IN ISRAEL?
RAJA KHALIDI
Despite the expectations of economic theory, a century of Arab-Jewish
economic interaction in Palestine has not led to the convergence that is
supposed to result from exchange between a capital-rich economy and
a labor-intensive one. After 60 years of failed integration, the Arab pop-
ulation in Israel has fallen to the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.
With the Palestinian “regional economies” in Israel and the occupied
territories operating as part of the same Israeli economic regime, the
challenge for Palestinian economic policy makers is to build on the
new paradigm in shaping a national development strategy aimed at
reconstructing Arab-Jewish economic relations on the principles of bal-
anced cooperation embodied in the Economic Annex of the 1947 UN
partition resolution.
SIXTY YEARS AFTER the establishment of the State of Israel, the Palestinian Arab
people who remained behind and were incorporated as a minority within
the state face an uncertain future. Abandoned politically by the Palestinian
national movement and its authority in the occupied territories, they remain on
the margins of Israeli politics, society, and culture. Nevertheless, these “Arab
Israelis”1 have important lessons to impart to their Palestinian compatriots,
especially in terms of steadfastness in the face of adversity. A determining factor
in their survival as a national (not an ethnic) minority has been the manner in
which the limited economic resources and assets at their disposal have been
identified with their nationality, or their “Arabness,” in a Jewish state. In a similar
way, Israeli settlement and separation policies in the occupied territories have
consolidated a Palestinian economic entity that has been the backbone of the
survival of a fledgling national identity and entity. As the viability of the two-state
vision appears to recede with time, the challenge of envisioning the economic
underpinnings of an eventual one-state resolution of this century-old conflict
grows.
This essay is premised on the observation that the economy of the Arab
region in Israel2 and the Palestinian economy in the occupied territories, today
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both operating within the Israeli economic system, constitute the remnants
of the Arab part of the dual economy that functioned in Mandatory Palestine
until 1948. A brief review of the various theses and counter-theses advanced in
socioeconomic research on the Palestinians in Israel demonstrates how Israeli
political economy explanations for the Arab-Jewish development gap were
eventually countered and effectively outflanked by a body of mainly indigenous
Palestinian Arab narratives. Available data on the macro and sectoral levels
help draw an up-to-date picture of the de-developed socioeconomic status of
Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Without making the links explicit here, this review
implies a range of possible outcomes for the Palestinian economy in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) under prolonged occupation. This macroview of
the Palestinian Arab economies operating today within the Israeli economic
orbit forms the starting point for suggesting that the time is opportune for a
new vision of a Palestinian national economic strategy that deploys a range of
subregional economic assets and coordinated development programs.
THE DUAL ECONOMY: FROM PARTITION 1947 TO RE-PARTITION 2007
One of the ironies of the history of the Palestine question is that while the
two-state territorial partition solution of UN General Assembly (UNGA) Reso-
lution 181 of 1947 remains elusive, its economic annex, which transformed
the dual-economy model of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine into a plan for
“economic union,” has been realized and has been operational on a de facto
basis since 1967. With the Israeli fiscal, monetary, and trade regime in force
throughout Israel and the occupied territories, economic union in its most ad-
vanced form (albeit of the lopsided dual-economy variety) is the economic law
of the land. Needless to say, this has emerged along different boundaries and
on principles contrary to those envisioned by the framers of UNGA Res. 181.
As the British Mandate in Palestine drew to a close in 1947, a dual economy
model of Jewish-Arab economic relations had already started to take shape,
diffused territorially and demographically throughout the country. However
unbalanced, unequal, and separate the Arab and Jewish economic sectors may
have been, they were nonetheless linked, and together they constituted the
“national” economy of Mandatory Palestine.3 Despite a demographic balance
overwhelmingly in favor (2:1) of the Palestinian Arab population, the economy
of the Jewish minority was predominant, enjoying dynamic links with European
capital, industrial know-how, and high-quality human resources. The mainly ru-
ral/agrarian Arab economy, by contrast, was clearly at a different stage on the
developmental ladder and on a separate trajectory with respect to external
trade networks, financial links, and structural transformation processes.4 Still,
exchanges (of labor, merchandise, and services) between the two were intense
and often complementary. In this sense, the potential benefits to both sectors
of continuing close interaction could be expected, assuming a post-Mandate
Palestine in the context of mutually agreed-upon and balanced economic reg-
ulations, institutions, and mechanisms.
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From the standpoint of the UN’s technical experts, who drew up the eco-
nomic union plan relying on the conventional economic theory and expe-
rience of the time, the only option for a future two-state solution was the
dual-economy model already emerging between the two communities.5 It was
entirely reasonable to assume that if economic union had been pursued as
designed in the context of implementing the political and territorial solution
of UNGA Res. 181, such an arrangement should have been able, over time,
to achieve the goal of closing the dual-economy gaps of Mandate Palestine.
Certainly there was a reasonable possibility in such conditions that a mutually
beneficial economic union between two sovereign states might ultimately have
been realized through the eventual convergence of per capita Arab and Jewish
incomes.
While an effective “economic union” between Israelis and Palestinians did
in fact emerge within Israel after 1948, it was not built upon peace, as UNGA
Res. 181 had intended it to be. Instead, it was born of intergenerational con-
flict, military rule, discrimination, occupation, and segregation between an
industrializing, advanced, and sovereign center on the one hand and a rural,
poor, and leaderless periphery on the other. This has created a re-partition of
economic power on the ground today that does not follow the borders or bal-
ances assumed in UNGA Res. 181 and which is best understood as an outcome
of prolonged conflict, if not a tool of domination, as some Israeli strategists
have envisioned. What has happened, then, is the opposite of the UN vision of
economic union (and, much later, of the Oslo concept of economic coopera-
tion), which was meant to facilitate a resolution to the conflict. Without doubt,
the economic “union” between Israelis and Palestinians that has emerged is a
construct that could not have been envisaged even by the most prescient UN
bureaucrats sixty years ago.
In a sense, the dual economy, in its current distorted and unbalanced form,
comprises not two distinct economic systems but four. The Jewish Israeli part
of the dual economy equation has expanded territorially from within the 1949
armistice lines to encompass and integrate Israeli settlements throughout the
West Bank and is ever predominant. The other party to this peculiar dualism,
the marginalized and impoverished Palestinian Arab economy, now comprises
three separate and distinct economies, each of which is more dependent on the
Israeli center than on each other: the remaining noncolonized areas of the West
Bank, the now wholly isolated Gaza Strip, and the Arab-majority subdistricts
of central and especially northern Israel. After forty years of occupation of
the former two regions and sixty years of failed integration of the latter, the
economic landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now fractured and
distorted, the Palestinian economies separated from each other and from the
Israeli economy as never before.
As has always been the case, the path of Palestinian economic develop-
ment remains subordinated to political imperatives and facts on the ground.
The forthcoming phase of the prolonged struggle over land, people, and re-
sources in Palestine/Israel will thus retain an important economic dimension.
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However, the concept of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations that has been
defined by (and prevailed since) the Oslo accords appears increasingly obso-
lete in light of the political prospects being shaped by the ongoing conflict.6
Economic policy analysts must therefore recognize the extent to which po-
litical and demographic realities on the ground have resulted in an economic
power structure that transcends the usual parameters defining the economic
implications of a two-state solution.
CHALLENGES OF PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ISRAEL
SINCE 1948
One of the factors generally discounted by politicians, academics, and other
observers is the place of Israel’s Palestinian minority in the overall Palestinian-
Arab/Jewish-Israeli equation. The status of the Palestinians of Israel has at best
been considered a marginal political or civil rights issue in domestic Israeli
politics—one that cannot even be broached in “final status” discussions. Only
since the 1990s have Arab civil society representatives in Israel redefined their
relationship to the state: Increasingly, they see it in terms of a struggle for na-
tional and cultural autonomy within an Israeli “state of all its citizens,” even
as the Arab demographic “threat” continues to feature prominently in Israeli
political and academic discourse. Meanwhile, this sixth of Israel’s population7
straddles a geostrategic position in the overall competition for natural resources
and national income both within Israel proper and between the green line and
the current frontiers of Israel’s effective control in the occupied territories.
This has implications beyond the traditional discussion about the Palestinian-
Israeli economic relationship. Whether from the perspective of the Palestinian
development research problematique or of economic policy-making, these
geo/demographic realities take us back to the economic contours and bal-
ances envisioned by UNGA Res. 181 as part of any serious discussion of future
directions.
Notwithstanding decades of research on many aspects of the Arab economy
in Israel, the extensive findings by sociologists, geographers, political scientists,
and economists generally show the use of conceptual frameworks and method-
ological tools that are inappropriate for examining past performance and future
prospects. Certainly, scholars working on this issue since the 1960s have made
valuable contributions in interrelated areas of research such as agricultural
modernization and land use, labor force dynamics and human resources, class
and social differentiation, and entrepreneurial development. However, the eco-
nomic status and potential of over a million Arab citizens of Israel remains a
marginal issue in academic research and in the policy debate surrounding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Arab minority is seen either as an exotic nonis-
sue, a subject for anthropological research, or a worthy cause in the struggle
for equality, civil rights, and integration within Israel.
As for the Palestinian minority itself, its still-separate identity, confirmed by
stubborn spatial, cultural, demographic, and policy-related realities, has led
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to growing calls for political autonomy in Israel, most recently in the various
manifestos and “vision papers” of 2006–7.8 But the economic implications
of a struggle for such a status remain unexplored, whether in the current
context of continued absolute Israeli control or in a hypothetical two-state
(or even one-state) political solution. The vital economic policy issues on the
agenda of the Palestinian minority—especially unemployment, local finances,
housing, land tenure, industrial zoning, agricultural viability, poverty, social
fragmentation, and delinquency—have yet to be formulated politically into
a coherent analysis of the Palestinian development experience in Israel, or
The concept of an “Arab
economy” in Israel is not
clearly defined, mainly
because the Israeli
democratic state-building
narrative has always
insisted on presenting the
Arab minority as part and
parcel its self-portrayed
“cultural mosaic.”
into a platform with strategic implications. Indeed, the
concept of an “Arab economy” in Israel is neither clearly
defined nor well-understood, much less accepted. This
is mainly because the Israeli democratic state-building
narrative has always insisted on presenting the Arab mi-
nority as part and parcel of Israeli society and state, as an
element of Israel’s self-portrayed “cultural mosaic.” Ac-
cordingly, for purposes of academic analysis, the subject
has remained at the disaggregated level of Arab work-
ers, farmers, workshops, entrepreneurs, and localities
in the Israeli economy.
An important underlying factor that has perpetuated neglect of this issue
in the policy analysis of Palestinian development relates to the manner in
which it has been treated in most of the literature: that is, as a subtheme of an
Israeli development experience rather than as a feature of the broader conflict.
Much of this literature, dominated by Israeli academics, is devoted to trying to
reconcile the subordinate status of Palestinian Arabs in Israel with an assump-
tion of their inevitable eventual “integration” as equal citizens into the Israeli
state and hence their access to equal opportunities in the national economy.
The methodological acrobatics required to sustain such a suspension of be-
lief are impressive. To explain persistent Arab-Jewish economic inequality in
Israel, a range of socioeconomic factors have been cited, including the flight
of Palestinian urban elites in 1948; resistance of the Palestinian fellahin to Is-
raeli modernization; the market forces that pulled Israel into the liberalized
global economy and left behind “stragglers”; and (in more recent studies) the
linkage between the Palestinian minority’s perpetually low occupational status
and educational achievements. Cause and effect are often reversed in the quest
for an economic narrative that fits with Israel’s democratic credentials so as to
buttress the notion of equal rights and opportunities for all citizens.
Research and academic literature on Palestinian economic conditions in
Israel can conveniently be classified under two broad categories largely de-
fined by the explicit or implicit ideological positions they embody. The old-
est and most pervasive trend, which emerged in the 1960s from the liberal,
social-democratic tradition of Israeli academia, has today evolved into a form
of “Zionist neoliberalism.”9 Emanating from a humanist reaction to the devasta-
tion wrought by Zionism against the Palestinian inhabitants of the country, this
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school of thought has always reflected a blind faith in the justice of the Israeli
system, an assumption of equal rights for non-Jews in a Jewish state, and a die-
hard belief that the operation of the market and the occasional state-sponsored
policy palliative could somehow correct the numerous distortions created by
nonmarket forces.
The subtext of much of the research under this category reflects both the
“security first” logic of Arab development in Israel and the deep-rooted Zion-
ist fears of the Arab demographic threat. This body of research, which has
flourished since the 1980s as the state grappled with rising Palestinian-Arab na-
tionalist mobilization in Israel, has sustained the lingering belief that growing
gaps and distortions are amenable to correction by market forces (or, if need be,
by programmed government intervention and positive discrimination). Even
recently, a group of highly respected Israeli economists proposed to revisit the
question of “whether Israeli Arabs operate in the same markets as the rest of
the population” and whether “two distinct ethnic markets” exhibit “conver-
gence over time”10—as if this were a question that required yet more academic
inquiry.
The second broad category, best grouped under the rubric of “non-Zionist
political economy,” developed later, especially since the 1980s, as new insights
into the socioeconomic situation of Palestinians in Israel began to emerge from
a number of diverse ideological sources and disciplines. These latter contribu-
tions share an understanding of (a) how the Jewish state-building policy envi-
ronment before and after 1948 resulted in built-in impediments to Palestinian-
Arab integration (politically, economically, and socially) within Israel; (b) how
successive Israeli governments have failed to address (much less act to amelio-
rate) the core issues; and (c) how historical processes of dispossession, segre-
gation, and marginalization have disempowered the Palestinian minority and
created visible ceilings to advancement. Some of this research has come from
outside the economic sciences, opening new perspectives on both specific and
more overarching aspects of Arab socioeconomic status in Israel. This body of
research, like that of the Zionist neoliberal writers, was empirically based and
scientifically rigorous.11
The various gaps and constraints noted by writers within the “non-Zionist”
group of political economists are understood as part of a comprehensive whole
that pits a discriminatory, hegemonic Jewish state (and economy) against an
ethno-national minority unable to access its fair share of national resources.
The losing struggle to maintain access to natural resources and to obtain na-
tional finance for development plays out in persistent gaps and imbalances in
Arab educational advancement, occupational progress, and capital accumula-
tion. It also entails an overall deterioration of terms of trade (labor, goods, and
services) between the Arab (”regional”) economy and the Jewish (“national”)
economy.12
Notwithstanding the different disciplines and divergent approaches inform-
ing the research of the two groups, they do share some consensus on certain
points:
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 There are persistent gaps between the Arab and Jewish sectors of the
Israeli economy in most, if not all, socioeconomic and development
indicators.
 These gaps are not coincidences of history, explained simply by
comparative sectoral resource allocations; rather, they emanate from
distinct external processes that impede the free operation of theoretically
perfect (but actually imperfect) markets.
 Although economic convergence in the long term is promised, achieving
this is no less complex or certain than is global convergence between
developed and developing countries, and it requires sustained policy
intervention to assure such an outcome.
 The marginalization of Arabs in Israel is not unrelated to the state’s Jewish
character and its Zionist development policy preferences and priorities.
 The political, economic, and social processes that have contributed to
marginalization of the Arab economy began well before 1948 and continue
today to lock in and further degrade the position of Arabs in Israeli
economy and society.13
On the other hand, clear differences of opinion remain on some major points:
 Whether the determinant processes that have perpetuated Arab
underdevelopment in Israel are related primarily to internal (Arab)
constraints and the “normal” development path, or whether they are
intrinsic to the particular (existential) situation of being Palestinian Arab
in a Jewish state;
 Whether the overall impact of the modern, capitalized, liberalized, and
globally connected Israeli Jewish economy has been to pull the rural, less
developed, traditional Arab society into the twenty-first century, or
whether its impact has been to maintain the Arab sector’s less developed,
subservient, and fragmented status and its role as a source of cheap labor,
goods, and services, and as a captive consumer market;
 Whether the Palestinian minority will remain leaderless, lacking the
necessary “self-consciousness” and distinct, separate identity within Israel,
or whether it will succeed in mobilizing itself and its full weight within the
Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict.
What seems beyond question is that without a radical rethinking and political
repositioning of the Arab minority in Israeli politics and society, as well as
within the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian context, effective policies
and programs that favor the development of the Arab economy in Israel are
unlikely to emerge.
THE PERSISTENCE OF AN ARAB “REGIONAL” ECONOMY IN ISRAEL
In 1988, I published the findings of my own examination of the Arab econ-
omy in Israel that utilized tools of (subnational) regional economic analysis.14
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The analysis identified four factors that defined and delineated the Arab “re-
gion”: (1) Israeli state policy; (2) geophysical features; (3) the Arab community’s
social, political, and cultural network and organization; and (4) persistent eco-
nomic differentials (vis-a`-vis the Jewish economy). My analysis of the Arab-Israeli
economy as a marginalized, impoverished, and largely subservient region of a
national (Jewish/Zionist) economy served the dual objective of elaborating a
comprehensive profile of its structure and performance and of providing a pol-
icy framework in which a strategy and program for its sustained development
could be designed and implemented.
Such a strategy could hardly be expected from the Israeli state and would
have been possible only from Palestinian economic/development policymak-
ers willing to take up the challenge of fitting the Arab-Israeli economy within a
broader program of civil resistance, development, and institution-building that
would also encompass the Palestinians in the occupied territories. In fact, the
post-Oslo configuration on the ground could have made such an option more
feasible, because economic exchanges between Palestinians in Israel and Pales-
tinians in what became the PLO-ruled areas of the WBGS were legitimized and
expanded during this period. At the same time, however, the political condi-
tions imposed by the Oslo accords removed Israel’s Palestinian minority from
the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating agenda and effectively severed the political
links that had hitherto developed between the Palestinian civil society and
political elites in Israel and the PLO (in exile). While the Palestinians in Israel
may have seen themselves as “an inseparable part of the Palestinian people,”15
the terms of Oslo and the PLO’s preoccupation with the affairs of the new
Palestinian Authority (PA) clearly placed them on the Israeli side of the polit-
ical border, separating them from the arena of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
From that time forward, their concerns were relegated to the domain of civil
and human rights issues, as if their share in final status issues had already been
unilaterally resolved as an internal Israeli affair.
Twenty years after my study, it is timely to assess how well the regional eco-
nomic model of the relationship between the Arab and Jewish sectors in Israel
reflects current realities by reviewing key gaps and relationships in light of
more recent data. What remains to be seen is whether or not the Arab-Jewish
economic imbalance in Israel, if not that between Israel and the occupied
territories, is defined by the persistence of economic divergence and its endur-
ing geo/ethnic contours. The potential relevance of such a model as a policy-
making tool seems even greater in the light of the latest wave of Palestinian Arab
“regional autonomy” activism, especially as persistent socioeconomic gaps can
have a social “consciousness-creating” effect over a prolonged period.
Currently available data are not easily comparable with those used in my
previous research for regional spatial analysis, so it is not possible here to
make direct comparisons with the indicators used for the situation in the mid-
1980s. However, new comparative socioeconomic data for Arab and non-Arab
localities published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS)16 confirm
the extent to which the poorest and weakest sectors of the Israeli economy
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are predominantly Arab, as well as the extent to which the Arab economy is
predominantly poor. An Israeli version of a “human development index” for
2003 covers 197 Israeli local councils and municipalities, accounting for just
under 6 million people. These councils and municipalities include the bulk
of the Israeli population (6.4 million in 2003) as well as almost all localities
in Israel.17 Of the total 197 localities covered, 70 are Arab, representing some
838,000 persons, or about 80 percent of the Arabs of Israel. The remaining
250,000 Arab Israelis live in the smallest villages or are included in indicators
for the five mixed cities (Acre, Haifa, Ramla, Lod, Jaffa).
The ICBS data on this critical mass of the Arab-Israeli economy paint a dismal
picture of the results of sixty years of failed integration (and Arab exclusion)
in Israel. Of the 197 Arab, Jewish, and mixed localities, 102 show composite
socioeconomic indices below the median. Of these localities, two-thirds (66)
are Arab. Only four small Arab villages are above the median. Of the 10 localities
at the bottom of the index, seven are Arab; of the 70 least advantaged local-
ities, 52 are Arab. When the unweighted averages (for almost all indicators)
are compared, the differences between the Arab population and the national
average acquire sharper focus:18
 The median age of the Arab population included in the ICBS index is 8
years below the median age of the national population (28 years), implying
major long-term employment challenges for a young and growing Arab
population;
 While only 16 percent of Israeli families have four or more children, the
Arab average is twice as high (33 percent), attesting to increasing pressure
on housing, social services, and utilities within the Arab sector;
 Arab average per capita income (at around NIS 1,300 per month,
approximately $300) is under half the national average, though the gap has
narrowed over time;
 Whereas 44 percent of the total population were “sub-minimum wage
earners,” 57 percent of Arabs fall within that category;
 Conversely, 8.6 percent of all Israeli full-time employees earned more than
twice the minimum wage, as compared to about 2 percent of Arabs;
 Educational achievement is the only category where the gap is relatively
narrow: 40 percent of Arab students attain their secondary matriculation
certificate, compared to a national average of 49 percent;
 By contrast, fewer than 7 percent of Arabs between the ages of 20 and 29
are in higher education, compared to a national average twice that.
This snapshot of socioeconomic gaps is underpinned by many factors, too
numerous to present here but well covered in the wealth of non-Zionist litera-
ture referred to above. Suffice it to say that one of the most important features in
the transformation of the Arab economy in Israel has been agricultural decline
and marginalization. It is true that the falling share of agriculture in Israeli GDP
reflects a developmental transformation, whereby heavy, medium, light (and
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later high-tech) industries and services gradually replaced agriculture as the
leading production and export sector. But the contraction in Arab agriculture
was not accompanied by the emergence of more productive, technologically
advanced industrial activities. Moreover, it must be noted that the contraction in
Arab agriculture was primarily a consequence of extensive land expropriations
by the state through the 1980s, compounded by pressures on the remaining
land by a rapidly growing rural population (leading to a process that has been
termed in situ urbanization) as well as by competition from a highly organized,
state-supported Jewish agricultural export establishment.
The decline in Arab agriculture can be glimpsed through reference to agri-
cultural and crop area changes over the past thirty years. Available data19 tell
us that whereas the total area devoted to agriculture in Israel has actually
expanded by 4 percent over that period, in the Arab region it has fallen by
16 percent. As non-crop agricultural activities (livestock, fisheries) have in-
creased their share of total area devoted to agriculture in Israel, the area de-
voted to crops has fallen by 5 percent: In the Arab economy, the decline in
crop area has been 25 percent. In both the national and regional economies,
this has been offset by a steady increase in livestock breeding of around 150
percent in the Arab sector and about as much in the Jewish sector. By 2001,
more than 50 percent of Israeli livestock was within the Arab sector, indi-
cating a rational shift by Arab farmers into more lucrative sectors of Israeli
agriculture.
Meanwhile, the pattern of utilization of crop areas—fruit and olive planta-
tions, vegetables/potatoes/melons (VPM, mainly irrigated) and (rain-watered)
field crops—has shifted nationally (especially in the Jewish economy) away
from the third branch toward cultivation of export/cash crops, especially in
the second branch. In Arab agriculture, the decline in field crops was accompa-
nied by a steady decline in the cultivation of more lucrative (and labor-intensive)
vegetables. The Arab farmers’ move away from this water-intensive branch of
agriculture has been rationally motivated, their state-determined water quotas
having always been lower than those of Israeli collective farms and kibbutzim.
Consistent with the increasingly unattractive long-term income prospects of
agriculture in Israel, the struggle over resources, and the increasing pauperiza-
tion of Arab rural communities, the greatest shift in Arab agriculture has been
the steady increase (67 percent over 30 years) of land devoted to (mainly olive)
plantations, which constitute around 25 percent of all Israeli plantations. Of the
179,000 dunams20 of Arab olive and fruit plantations in 1999, 22 percent were
irrigated; of the much larger area of 849,000 dunams of plantations cultivated
by Jewish farms, 82 percent were irrigated, seventeen times the Arab irrigated
plantation area.21
The labor force characteristics of Arabs in Israel also continue to exhibit
important differentials vis-a`-vis the Jewish labor force, though less sharply than
in the past. Whereas labor force participation rates of Arab males are close
to those of Jewish males, low Arab female participation keeps the overall av-
erage at around 40 percent, compared to a national average of 60 percent.22
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Unemployment rates among Israeli Arabs are consistently higher than in the
Jewish economy (12 percent compared to 8.3 percent in 2000). Arabs are
also more concentrated than Jews in low-skilled occupations. The largest two
sectoral employers of Arabs in Israel are manufacturing (20.6 percent of all
employed) and construction (15 percent), which employ only 17.8 percent
and 3.8 percent of Jews, respectively. A larger proportion of the Jewish labor
force is employed in public and private services than Arabs: 34 percent and
38 percent, compared to 26 percent and 33 percent, respectively. Meanwhile
agriculture, which employed 17,000 Arabs in 1980, employed only half as many
by 2000 (not all of them employed on Arab farms).
One should not conclude from the above outline of Arab-Jewish socioeco-
nomic differentials that time has stood still for Arabs in Israel, or that they have
been totally bypassed by Israeli development. Many basic needs, such as health
care, universal education, and social welfare, have not been neglected by the
state, and proximity to the more advanced Jewish economy has allowed for
“gains” that many Palestinians living under occupation or in exile would envy.
The newest Arab generation is increasingly “Israelized” (and “globalized”) cul-
turally, as the pre-1948 traditions that sustained social cohesion gradually falter
(which has resulted in a degradation of social capital). Furthermore, the pro-
gressive path of Israeli economic development has freed up middle occupa-
tional levels where Palestinians hitherto could not compete. The result is that
more educated Arab professionals are gaining a foothold in the national econ-
omy outside the specific context of the traditional Arab communities where
they were raised.
Such facts should not be discounted in any assessment of how far Palestinian
Arabs in Israel have progressed in sixty years, and what potentialities that cre-
ates for their future. For example, the emergence of Israeli Arab capitalists,
generated largely through services and commerce (as compared to limited in-
dustrial capital investment accumulated up to the 1990s) is an indicator of the
potential for mobilizing ethnic economic power. Although much is conspic-
uously consumed by these new Arab commercial elites, or “saved” through
residential construction and land acquisition (but rarely invested in new en-
terprises), a financial policy framework for mobilizing more “developmental”
investment within the Arab region remains sorely lacking.
Overall, however, there is little evidence of significantly greater Arab inte-
gration in the Israeli economy today than in the past. Economic exchanges
between Arabs and Jews in Israel have not entailed inclusive development, and
they continue on the distorted and disadvantaged basis that has always char-
acterized the regional-national relationship. However many economic success
stories we may hear of Palestinians in Israel, a “regional” approach to under-
standing the overall economic “de-development” of the Arab sector has not lost
its validity. In fact, most of the success stories are uniquely “Arab” insofar as they
result from a struggle against adverse conditions and show the entrepreneurial
tenacity and social adaptability that can be generated by prolonged and dire
hardship.
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The structural trends and binding constraints on which Israeli economic suc-
cess has depended are the very factors that have perpetuated a separate and
dependent economic status of a million Palestinian Arabs in Israel. The latter’s
economic fate is almost as confined to the limited space in which they reside
as is the fate of the economy of the Palestinian people encircled in Gaza or frag-
mented in zones behind the separation barrier. Political developments among
the Palestinians in Israel in the wake of the Oslo accords, which have featured
growing Arab political autonomy and calls for more, beg an autonomous (read:
regional) social and economic development strategy powered from within
and self-reliant to the extent possible. It is about time that the lessons of Pales-
tinian economic development under prolonged conflict are absorbed and the
potential for mobilizing “ethnic economic power” are seriously explored.
AN ECONOMIC PARADIGM FOR THE ONE-STATE SOLUTION?
Even after seven years of intifada, disintegration, and growing Israeli-
Palestinian physical and economic separation, discourse on Israeli-Palestinian
economic relations still generally assumes the possibility and desirability of
achieving a balance in respective power and interests of two sovereign states.
At the least optimistic, there is a supposedly a possibility of levelling the playing
field between the two unequal partners through policy interventions, appro-
priate trade regimes, aid, and cooperation between them. Whereas this may
have still seemed plausible as late as 2000, such a starting point quite simply no
longer exists. The Israeli-Palestinian customs union established in 1994 remains
the de jure framework for relations between the West Bank and Israel, but its
weaknesses, inherent from the outset, are now fully exposed as Israel applies
its provisions selectively and in line with its security and political agendas.23
Thus, while economic analysts and policymakers question the rationale of pro-
longing the current dysfunctional framework for Israeli-PA economic relations
(not the subject of this essay), it is useful to take a broader view, unencum-
bered by conventional assumptions about what is desirable and attainable for
Palestinian development in the present circumstances.
Of relevance here is a dimension of the Arab-Israeli economic landscape
that had growing importance from the 1990s until 2000: the (largely undocu-
mented) economic links between the Arab-Israeli economy and the Palestinian
economy in the WBGS under the PA. These links did not reach a degree of eco-
nomic integration, but could be described as intensive and focused exchange.
The mainly informal commercial, labor, and financial relations that emerged be-
tween the Galilee/Triangle areas and the WBGS expanded during the second
half of the 1990s, especially as the latter grew during that period. The exchanges
were indicative of more than just market forces or even geographic proximity,
but they were abruptly constrained as the physical separation between Israel
and the WBGS deepened.
For both sides of the exchange, the common basis of the relationship differed
from that which exists between (non-Arab) Israeli consumers, contractors, or
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exporters and the economy administered by the PA. Common factors such
as consumption patterns, income levels, business culture, language, and so-
cial solidarity naturally placed the relationship between the Arab-Israeli and
PA economies in a different category from that between the Israeli and PA
economies. Even today, many Galilee- or Triangle-based Arab capitalists and
commercial agents maintain business flows with WBGS markets through the
Jerusalem-Ramallah corridor and other limited contact/entry points. Until 2001,
Gaza enjoyed a booming export trade with Arab Israelis who came by the bus-
load to buy cheap imported Egyptian consumer goods and fresh Gaza agricul-
tural produce. Throughout the Oslo period, workers from Gaza found regular
employment and shelter in Arab communities in northern Israel; today they are
hunted down relentlessly by Israeli police as illegal migrants. This distinctive
link has been severed, and the Gaza region of the Israeli-Palestinian economic
cluster is today totally isolated from both the Palestinian economy in the West
Bank and the Arab regional economy further to the north.
Whereas these subregional relationships were very far from approximat-
ing a “neo-dual economy” model, the comparative advantages characterizing
the exchanges between the WBGS and the Arab regional economy in Israel
demonstrate structural complementarities that must be explored. At the cur-
rent stage of the conflict, as the two-state option seems to recede—to be re-
placed by unknown outcomes—it appears timely to project what has been
learned about historical processes and what we know about the economic
facts on the ground with a view toward elaborating a strategic developmental
policy framework in line with the emerging realities of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Fresh empirical and analytical research (beyond the scope of this arti-
cle) could demonstrate that the functional relationship linking all components
of the Arab regional economy (i.e., the Arab economies in the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, and the Galilee/Triangle) with the Israeli national (i.e., Jewish)
economy is one of an isolated, less advanced (or de-developed) regional econ-
omy (periphery) and an expanding, liberalized, high-tech national economy
(center).24
One of the new realities is that the attributes of institutional, administrative,
and limited fiscal autonomy acquired by the economy administered by the
Palestinian Authority in 1994 has been largely lost in recent years.25 Thus, if
there is to be a new stage in Palestinian economic governance, it will certainly
have to go beyond the experiment that has been the PA. Meanwhile, the still ap-
parently legitimate case for the “viability” of an independent national economy
in a WBGS liberated of Israeli settlements and occupation is increasingly ren-
dered redundant by the facts of Israeli colonial expansion. While the separation
barrier has cantonized the West Bank, the Israeli “withdrawal/disengagement”
from Gaza has transformed realities there into a socioeconomic disaster zone.
We appear to be light-years away from the much trumpeted Oslo model of
Singapore on the Mediterranean.
Nevertheless, even in the context of Israel’s “separation” policy, the
economies of 3.5 million Palestinians in WBGS and another million behind
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the green line remain fixed within the Israeli economic orbit. The increas-
ingly fragile PA economy remains highly dependent on the center for access
to trade, jobs, technology, and consumption of goods and services—even
public services such as utilities, health, and education. Both the PA economy
and the Arab regional economy in Israel are almost identically affected by na-
tional (Israeli) macroeconomic, trade, and most components of fiscal policy.
All these features imply that there is more correlation between the WBGS
and Galilee/Triangle than has so far been recognized, whereas the most sig-
nificant convergence that seems to be occurring is among the impoverished
In the last few years the
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between the Palestinian
regional economies (West
Bank, Gaza Strip, and
Galilee/Triangle) have
become more striking even
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Arab regions themselves. In the last few years the struc-
tural resemblances between the Palestinian regional
economies have become more striking even as they
become more separated physically. Though per capita
incomes of Palestinians in the WBGS have plummeted
since 2000 to less than half the levels among Arab-
Israelis, both regions remain much closer in living stan-
dards to each other than to the Jewish economy. While
the WBGS economies retain a limited domestic produc-
tive base, external trade is conducted entirely with Israel
or through Israeli intermediaries. And in all the Palestinian regional economies,
domestic capital invested locally finds its safest allocation in real estate. Rela-
tively high educational standards do not translate into better occupational or
employment opportunities; unemployment is high in all Palestinian regions.
Perhaps the strongest justification for not considering Palestinian economic
development in Israel/Palestine from the angle of sub-national regional analysis
is the political imperative of Palestinian national self-determination within the
WBGS territorial boundaries.
Political considerations aside, it must be acknowledged that despite appear-
ances to the contrary, the functional dynamics in operation imply that, for all
intents and purposes, these Arab regional economies together with the Jew-
ish economy constitute one macroeconomy, with a dual institutional/policy
framework and structure/performance. Such a conceptual framework for ana-
lyzing Palestinian economic prospects, which recasts issues in the context of
a single economy’s relations to its regional components, is not a function of
methodological or political preferences but of reality. Indeed, insistence on ana-
lyzing the three Palestinian regional economies in isolation from each other and
from the Israeli/Jewish economy could be considered a function of outmoded
nationalist ideologies. Accordingly, it is necessary to explore anew the under-
lying dynamics of the relationship between the Jewish and Arab economies in
Israel/Palestine as constituting one macroeconomy.
For example, a simple way of viewing the imbalance in the national-regional
economic relationship is to estimate the share of the Palestinian Arab regional
economies in the total GNP of the macroeconomy of the Israeli-Palestinian
economic union. In 2006, total Israeli GNP was $141 billion, including some
$11 billion originating in the Arab regional economy.26 When added to the
GNP of the occupied territories, this amounts to a total of $146 billion, with
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the Arab regions therein accounting for $16 billion. This is strikingly low when
considering that the Palestinian Arabs within the borders of Israel/Palestine
constitute around 45 percent of the population living in that territory (but
produce only around 11 percent of its national income). This highlights the
scale of the challenge of Jewish/Arab economic convergence, which remains
further away on the horizon than it was six decades ago, when Arabs constituted
70 percent of the total population of Mandate Palestine, but their share of
national income was still 40 percent.27
The purpose of engaging at this late stage in a collective, interdisciplinary
effort to investigate the conditions and prospects of the Arab economy in Israel
should above all be to contribute to the elaboration of an “actionable” economic
and social development vision and the necessary policies and mechanisms to
achieve it. Such an analysis should set the stage for a development policy plan-
ning framework that could deliver sustainable social and economic gains for the
Arab-Israeli economy, as one of the three less-developed regions of the Israeli-
Palestinian “economic union.” This is imperative for several reasons. Most im-
mediately, this neglected sector of the Palestinian people has a unique develop-
ment experience from which the other segments could learn and build upon.
Of equal importance is the Arab community’s geographical/political/economic
position within long struggle over the land of Palestine/Israel and the need to
factor that into any lasting resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This
was most recently recognized by Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas, who,
in the wake of demands that the PLO recognize the Jewish character of Israel,
stated that he had rejected attempts to negate the existence of almost 1.5 mil-
lion Palestinian Arabs. If nothing else, this region, currently excluded from the
peace process, should benefit from any “peace dividend” that might emerge in
the context of a comprehensive regional settlement and the expected devel-
opment cooperation and resources that might ensue.
Whatever the ultimate reconfiguration of borders and the government that
might emerge if a peace process resumes, such a policy framework should
be capable primarily of responding to Palestinian Arab development needs
under any circumstances, whether a continuation of the status quo or an
implementation of the two-state or even a one-state solution. Although the fu-
ture of Palestinian citizens in Israel and their compatriots in the WBGS might
proceed along different political tracks, the common features of their histor-
ical relationship with the Israeli national economy are too glaring to ignore.
Moreover, the similarities in their economic structure and performance are an
outcome of similar processes delivering similar results in different “legal” con-
texts and at different stages of the conflict. Ultimately, the long-term prospects
and viability of the Jewish/Israeli economy itself depend on a more sustainable
and peaceful form of economic dualism, even if a cost is to be incurred in
redressing regional imbalances and narrowing economic disparities.
Thus, the hypothesis that the economic union designed in 1947 for par-
titioned Palestine has acquired a real existence has a direct bearing on how
to address Palestinian development policy for the future. If circumstances
continue to undermine the possibility of forging ahead and implementing
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partition (politically and territorially, with two states), then current realities
should be accepted as having overridden any remaining political imperative
for separate sovereignties in Palestine. This suggests the relevance of a Pales-
tinian Arab tri-regional development program in the context of a future one
state-solution—one that would aim to transform the Bantustan-type economic
relationship that exists today into an integrated, bi-national dual economy de-
velopment program. And if an independent and viable Palestinian state in the
WBGS is ever to see the light of day, the new Arab regional economic paradigm
outlined here can be a strategic asset for the Palestinian people, and, if treated
in the spirit of 1947, maybe even for peace.
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